ALERTA!!! NUEVO WORM PARA LINUX(DNS/BIND)
No tengo tiempo para traducir tal vez un administrador de este sitio lo puede hacer,
esto me llego hoy via la mailing list del LUG que soi miembro de.
Se trata de un WORM llamado Lion Worm que afecta cajas linux corriendo el BIND/DNS
y luego envia en /etc/passwd a una direccion en el dominio de china.com…
gracias a Rek2 de www.linuxbusca.com por el mensage
Aqui esta el mensage original:
---------- Forwarded Message ---------- Subject: FW: ALERT - A DANGEROUS NEW WORM IS SPREADING ON THE INTERNET Date: Fri, 23 Mar 2001 14:07:34 -0500 From: "Chuck Young"
To: Apologies to those who have already received this elsewhere. ---------------------- Chuck Young Internet Systems Engineer, New England Region Genuity, Inc. ---------------------- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 ALERT! A DANGEROUS NEW WORM IS SPREADING ON THE INTERNET March 23, 2001 7:00 AM Late last night, the SANS Institute (through its Global Incident Analysis Center) uncovered a dangerous new worm that appears to be spreading rapidly across the Internet. It scans the Internet looking for Linux computers with a known vulnerability. It infects the vulnerable machines, steals the password file (sending it to a China.com site), installs other hacking tools, and forces the newly infected machine to begin scanning the Internet looking for other victims. Several experts from the security community worked through the night to decompose the worm's code and engineer a utility to help you discover if the Lion worm has affected your organization. Updates to this announcement will be posted at the SANS web site, [URL=http://www.sans.org]http://www.sans.org[/URL] DESCRIPTION The Lion worm is similar to the Ramen worm. However, this worm is significantly more dangerous and should be taken very seriously. It infects Linux machines running the BIND DNS server. It is known to infect bind version(s) 8.2, 8.2-P1, 8.2.1, 8.2.2-Px, and all 8.2.3-betas. The specific vulnerability used by the worm to exploit machines is the TSIG vulnerability that was reported on January 29, 2001. The Lion worm spreads via an application called "randb". Randb scans random class B networks probing TCP port 53. Once it hits a system, it checks to see if it is vulnerable. If so, Lion exploits the system using an exploit called "name". It then installs the t0rn rootkit. Once Lion has compromised a system, it: - - Sends the contents of /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, as well as some network settings to an address in the china.com domain. - - Deletes /etc/hosts.deny, eliminating the host-based perimeter protection afforded by tcp wrappers. - - Installs backdoor root shells on ports 60008/tcp and 33567/tcp (via inetd, see /etc/inetd.conf) - - Installs a trojaned version of ssh that listens on 33568/tcp - - Kills Syslogd , so the logging on the system can't be trusted - - Installs a trojaned version of login - - Looks for a hashed password in /etc/ttyhash - - /usr/sbin/nscd (the optional Name Service Caching daemon) is overwritten with a trojaned version of ssh. The t0rn rootkit replaces several binaries on the system in order to stealth itself. Here are the binaries that it replaces: du, find, ifconfig, in.telnetd, in.fingerd, login, ls, mjy, netstat, ps, pstree, top - - "Mjy" is a utility for cleaning out log entries, and is placed in /bin and /usr/man/man1/man1/lib/.lib/. - - in.telnetd is also placed in these directories; its use is not known at this time. - - A setuid shell is placed in /usr/man/man1/man1/lib/.lib/.x DETECTION AND REMOVAL We have developed a utility called Lionfind that will detect the Lion files on an infected system. Simply download it, uncompress it, and run lionfind. This utility will list which of the suspect files is on the system. At this time, Lionfind is not able to remove the virus from the system. If and when an updated version becomes available (and we expect to provide one), an announcement will be made at this site. Download Lionfind at [URL=http://www.sans.org/y2k/lionfind-0.1.tar.gz]http://www.sans.org/y2k/lionfind-0.1.tar.gz[/URL] REFERENCES Further information can be found at: [URL=http://www.sans.org/current.htm]http://www.sans.org/current.htm[/URL] [URL=http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2001-02.html,]http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2001-02.html,[/URL] CERT Advisory CA-2001-02, Multiple Vulnerabilities in BIND [URL=http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/196945]http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/196945[/URL] ISC BIND 8 contains buffer overflow in transaction signature (TSIG) handling code [URL=http://www.sans.org/y2k/t0rn.htm]http://www.sans.org/y2k/t0rn.htm[/URL] Information about the t0rn rootkit. The following vendor update pages may help you in fixing the original BIND vulnerability: Redhat Linux RHSA-2001:007-03 - Bind remote exploit [URL=http://www.redhat.com/support/errata/RHSA-2001-007.html]http://www.redhat.com/support/errata/RHSA-2001-007.html[/URL] Debian GNU/Linux DSA-026-1 BIND [URL=http://www.debian.org/security/2001/dsa-026]http://www.debian.org/security/2001/dsa-026[/URL] SuSE Linux SuSE-SA:2001:03 - Bind 8 remote root compromise. [URL=http://www.suse.com/de/support/security/2001_003_bind8_]http://www.suse.com/de/support/security/2001_003_bind8_[/URL] txt.txt Caldera Linux CSSA-2001-008.0 Bind buffer overflow [URL=http://www.caldera.com/support/security/advisories/CSSA-2001-008.0.txt]http://www.caldera.com/support/security/advisories/CSSA-2001-008.0.txt[/URL] [URL=http://www.caldera.com/support/security/advisories/CSSA-2001-008.1.txt]http://www.caldera.com/support/security/advisories/CSSA-2001-008.1.txt[/URL] This security advisory was prepared by Matt Fearnow of the SANS Institute and William Stearns of the Dartmouth Institute for Security Technology Studies. The Lionfind utility was written by William Stearns. William is an Open-Source developer, enthusiast, and advocate from Vermont, USA. His day job at the Institute for Security Technology Studies at Dartmouth College pays him to work on network security and Linux projects. Also contributing efforts go to Dave Dittrich from the University of Washington, and Greg Shipley of Neohapsis Matt Fearnow SANS GIAC Incident Handler If you have additional data on this worm or a critical quetsion please email email@example.com -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.0.4 (BSD/OS) Comment: For info see [URL=http://www.gnupg.org]http://www.gnupg.org[/URL] iD8DBQE6u17n+LUG5KFpTkYRAgn9AJ0ffubakBA47teAe9lF92lrS2H+TwCgh3T/ ek+YCliAS832nnMIzP28ezM= =E1SG -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----